



Dangling DNS Records for Cloud Resources: Detection, Impact & Mitigation

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Vulnerability

- Some cloud resources use a shared pool of IP addresses
- Admins enter these IPs and hosts into DNS
- Upon resource termination, DNS records remain
- Attackers or other customers may receive these addresses from the provider



Threat


- Repeatedly create instances and listen for traffic
- Listen for traffic directed at instance
- If DNS Records exist, attackers can get a TLS Certificate
 - Unencrypted SNI allows domain name discovery
 - Launch convincing phishing attacks



Threat (cont.)

- Spread malware
- Compromise websites (malicious JS)
- Credential stealing

Cloud Instance Lifecycle



DNS Lookup Process



service
admin

Update DNS A record for
quinnipiac.edu to be
192.152.243.60




dns provider



user

What's the IPv4 address for
quinnipiac.edu?



dns server

quinnipiac.edu is located at
192.152.243.60



user

192.152.243.60, send me website
contents for https://quinnipiac.edu



web server


website contents








Attack


- Admin sets up a cloud instance and DNS
- Admin deprovisions it
- Attacker obtains old IP address
- Attacker receives traffic for original domain














Server Name Indication

- Extension in TLS Client Hello Packet
- SNI can contain plaintext hostname
- Attacker can extract this easily

SSL Certificates via ACME Protocol






Methodology

- Enumerate all IP addresses and hostnames in cloud account
- Enumerate DNS records
- Perform classification on DNS records
- Match DNS records to cloud resources
- Alert on records for cloud resources not present in our account

Implementation - Resource Matching





Impact

- Data breaches
- Ransomware attack
- Proprietary information stolen
- Impact: Moderate to High



Likelihood

- Vulnerability information is public
- Not easy to target a specific org
- If threat event occurs, impact is high
- Rated: Moderate



Risk

- Risk: Moderate
- (Impact: Moderate * Likelihood: Moderate)



Live Demo



Mitigations & Conclusion

- Audit DNS configuration regularly
- Use Infrastructure-as-code to automate management
- Deploy CAA record to limit issuance of certificates
- Monitor Certificate logs for your domain
- Use cloud provider “BYOIP” instead of public pool



Questions?



Thank You



Sources

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